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OUTLINE OF THE NEW TAX AT SOURCE
ON DIVIDENDS
ECTION 213 of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which became effective on June 16, 1933, imposes upon
the receipt of dividends, which are required to be included in the gross income of the recipient under the Revenue
Act of 1932, by any person other than a domestic corporation, an excise tax of five per cent of the amount of such dividends. The tax is required to be deducted and withheld from
the dividends by the payor corporation. Dividends declared
before the date of the Act are not subject to the tax. The tax
does not apply to dividends of any corporation which is itself
exempt from income tax under the Revenue Act of 1932.
The corporation required to deduct and withhold any
tax is under the duty, on or before the last day of the month
following the payment of the dividend, to make a return
thereof and pay such tax to the Collector of Internal Revenue
of the District in which its principal place of business is located, or, if it has no principal place of business in the United
States, to the Collector at Baltimore, Maryland. The payor
corporation, under the Act, is made liable for the tax, and it is
by the statute indemnified against the claims and demands
of any person for the amount of any payment made in accordance with the terms thereof.
On July 14, 1933, there was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Acting
Secretary of the Treasury, Treasury Decision No. 4372,
which constitutes the rules and regulations for the administration and collection of the tax at source on dividends. Under
these regulations, the Departmental view is stated to be that
the tax does not apply to dividends declared before midnight,
June 15, 1933, and the position is also taken that where a
corporation leases property of another corporation, and in
consideration thereof agrees, among other things, to pay as
rental certain amounts in installments directly to the lessor's
shareholders, such payments, for the purpose of Section 213,
constitute dividends to the recipients, received as from the
lessor corporation. The lessee is regarded as the payor corporation, and is required to make the returns and withhold
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and pay the taxes, in respect of such dividends. A declaration
of dividends payable periodically in the future is regarded as
void under Section 213, unless the corporation at the time of
such declaration had sufficient profits, accumulated subsequent
to February 28, 1913, to enable it to pay all such future dividends, and an attempt to bind a corporation to pay future
dividends out of anticipated earnings is not regarded as a valid
declaration of dividends.
The regulations also commit the Bureau to what would
seem to be a proper construction of the statute with regard to
the making of returns, in that under such regulations a corporation is not required to make any return of non-payment
of dividends, but is simply required to make a return when
it is required to pay a tax, that is, on or before the last day
of the month following the month in which the dividends
were paid. The regulations also prescribe the form of the return to be made by the payor corporation, and forms of
exemption certificates for use in cases where it is claimed that
the recipient of the dividends is not liable to the tax in question, and prescribe the method by which such claim of exemption shall be established.
"The time is approaching when we shall not be warranted in
excusing our judicature for its defects on the ground that the legislature
has virtually monopolized control over the processes of justice. As an
argument for obtaining for the courts a larger part in formulating modes
of procedure criticism of statutory rules has served a purpose. But
would it not be reasonable to ask ;the judiciary to take stock of existing powers and
inaugurate such reforms as are possible on a sound basis of constitutional authority?
There has been insufficient thinking in this field.
"When the bar, a generation too late, awoke to the evils of lay competition,
there was an instinctive turning to the legislators for more laws, but soon it became
apparent that the judicial branch already had the remedies on the shelf ready to be
dispensed. The acceptance of responsibility for adequate legal training before admission
had already manifested itself in a number of states.
"Why have supreme courts been so timid in the use of rule-making power?
The answer is found in the uncertainty of tenure of most supreme court judges and
the lack of an integrated organization of the judicial branch. We have made a slow

-approach to the essential question whether judges are bound to permit justice to be
defeated through an inappropriatelegislated rule of procedure. Can they justify themselves by passing the buck to the legislature, an essentially irresponsible body?"

From "Undeueloped Judicial Powers," Journal of American Judicature Society,
October, 1933.

